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Climate Change, the Environment and Armed Conflict 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Climate change is a global problem. Scientists have determined that “climate change” can 
directly cause changes to the environment which in turn may then indirectly affect human 
beings in the long term.1 This paper does not aim to argue that climate change directly 
affects and causes armed conflict but that it does so indirectly, by causing environmental 
changes which could potentially be a significant factor in triggering or prolonging 
conflict.2 This is of course a potentially vicious cycle as armed conflict could, in turn, 
negatively affect the environment and the population, thereby leading to a new cycle of 
destruction.  
A causal link between climate change and armed conflict was clearly explained by 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in its 2007 report entitled Sudan: 
Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment3 [hereafter, 2007 UNEP Report]. Using the 
situation in Darfur as an example, this paper examines whether the current laws are 
appropriate to deal with the wider and indirect effects of climate change. In particular, the 
                                                
1 See generally: Global warming must stay below 2C or world faces ruin, scientists declare, The Times, 
May 28, 2009,   at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article6380709.ece (last accessed 
1st July 2009); David Cohen, Climate change could kill 500,000 a year by 2030, New Scientist, May 29, 
2009, at: http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn17218-climate-change-could-kill-500000-a-year-by-
2030.html (last accessed on 1st July 2009); The St James Palace Memorandum: “Action for a Low Carbon 
and Equitable Future”, St. James’ Palace Nobel Laureate Symposium, London, UK, 26 -28 May 2009 at: 
http://www.newscientist.com/data/doc/article/dn17218/sjp_memorandum.pdf (last accessed  1st July 2009). 
2 See generally, Robin McKie, Climate wars threaten billions, The Observer,  Nov 4, 2007 at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/nov/04/climatechange.scienceofclimatechange (last accessed 
1st July 2009). 
3 Sudan: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, UNEP, 2007, [hereafter, 2007 UNEP Report], at: 
http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Sudan.pdf (last accessed 4th August 2009). 
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question is raised as to whether the international community is endowed with the legal 
means to prevent armed conflicts borne out of environmental degradation caused by 
climate change. 
 
B. Causal Link Between Climate Change and Armed Conflict 
i) Climate Change 
In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)4 reported that warming 
of the climate system is unequivocal.5 As one scholar aptly noted:  
‘Climate change poses a long-term global threat, with significant human, national and 
international security implications. Its projected consequences range from weather extremes to 
resource depletion and exacerbation of existing social conflicts,  from compounding disease 
epidemics through to the complete disappearance of entire nation states, particularly low-lying 
island states in the South Pacific.’6  
 
The natural environment is necessary for our survival. However, with this new problem 
of climate change7 which is affecting the environment at an accelerated rate, causing 
changes and degradation, combined with the exploding human population, the 
environment will no longer be able to effectively fulfil out needs. Thus, conflicts may 
                                                
4 The IPCC was established by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) to improve the understanding of climate change, its potential impacts 
and recommendations or options for global adaptation and mitigation. The IPCC periodically publishes its 
scientific findings on climate change.  
5 Working Group I, IPCC, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis (IPCC Fourth Assessment 
Report, 2007), at: 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg1_report_the_p
hysical_science_basis.htm (last accessed 12th August 2009). 
6 Christopher K. Penny, ‘Greening the Security Council: Climate Change as an Emerging “Threat to 
International Peace and Security”’, (2007) 7.35-71 Int Environ Agreements 35, at p. 37 [hereafter, Penny 
2007]. 
7 For the purpose of this paper, the definition of “climate change” used will be based on the definition by 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), Art. 1 (2) as  ‘a change of 
climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global 
atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.’   
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result as the ever growing human population scrambles to compete for the decreasing 
resources provided by the changing environment.8 ‘Security analysts and academics have 
warned for some time now that climate change threatens water and food security, the 
allocation of resources, and coastal populations, threats which in turn could increase 
forced migrations, raise tensions and trigger conflict.’ 9 
The worrying issue of climate change has increasingly gained prominence in the 
last few decades. In fact the United Nations General Assembly indicated its concern in 
respect of this issue via Resolution 45/5310 which clearly stated that ‘climate change is a 
common concern of mankind, since climate is an essential condition which sustains life 
on earth.’11 However, in certain circumstances there is no doubt that the very real issue of 
climate change has been hyped up. For example, in 2003, the Pentagon commissioned 
two expert scenario analysts to consider the impact of abrupt climate change for 
international peace and security.12 When this came to the attention of the media, a slew of 
                                                
8 Climate Change and Conflict – New Report Weighs the Risks and Pin Points Likely Hotspots, Bali, 10 
December 2007, UNEP Press Release, at: 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=523&ArticleID=5720&l=en (last 
accessed 2nd July 2009). For an in depth analysis on climate change and international security by prominent 
German and Swiss academics, see the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU)  2007 Risk 
Analysis Report, Climate Change as a Security Risk, UK and US: Earthscan, 2008,  at: 
http://www.wbgu.de/wbgu_jg2007_engl.pdf (last accessed 2nd July 2009). 
9 Oli Brown, Anne Hammill and Robert McLeman, ‘Climate Change as the ‘New’ Security Threat: 
Implications for Africa’, (2007) 83 (6) International Affairs 1141 [hereafter, Brown, Hammill and 
McLeman 2007]. See also, Berel Rodal, ‘The environment and changing concepts of security’, Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service Commentary No. 47, August 1994, at: http://www.csis-
scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm47-eng.asp (last accessed 5th August 2009). 
10 A/RES/43/53 (6 December 1988) at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r053.htm (last accessed 
1st July 2009). 
11 Para. 1, A/RES/43/53, ibid. 
12 Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, ‘An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for the 
United States National Security’, October 2003, at: 
http://www.gbn.com/articles/pdfs/Abrupt%20Climate%20Change%20February%202004.pdf (last accessed 
14th August 2009). See also, ‘US Military Engages Climate Change’, NewScientist, August 10, 2009, at: 
http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/shortsharpscience/2009/08/us-military-declares-war-on-cl.html (last 
accessed 14th August 2009). 
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exaggerated new stories ensued. In fact, one media story hyped it up to the point of 
labelling climate change as the ‘mother of all national security issues.’13 
In 2004, the United Kingdom (UK) Government’s chief scientific advisor, Sir 
David King, stated that, ‘climate change is a far greater threat to the world than 
international terrorism.’14 ‘Margaret Beckett, the British Foreign Secretary between May 
2006 and June 2007, consciously made ‘climate security’ a central plank of British 
foreign policy during her short stint at the Foreign Office.’15 During a foreign policy 
address in Berlin in October 2006, she pointed out that: 
‘[w]hen people are exposed to the stresses caused by overpopulation, resource scarcity, environmental 
degradation, as they feel the security upon which they and their families depend progressively slipping away, 
so we see the slide down the spectrum from stability to instability. What should concern us here in the foreign 
policy community is that an unstable climate will place huge additional strain on these tensions which we 
spend our time trying to resolve. They are already at a breaking point and climate change has the potential to 
stretch them far beyond it. ’16 
 
In 2007, a panel of military advisors, consisting of eleven retired American admirals and 
generals  gave a report17 ‘arguing that climate change will act as a ‘threat multiplier’ that 
makes existing concerns, such as water scarcity and food insecurity, more complex and 
intractable and presents a tangible threat to American national security interests.’18 
                                                
13 David Stipp, ‘The Pentagon’s Weather Nightmare: The climate could change radically, and fast. That 
would be the mother of all national security issues’, Fortune, February 9, 2004, at: 
http://www.thewe.cc/weplanet/news/people/abrupt_climate_change_event.htm (last accessed 14th August 
2009). 
14 BBC News, ‘Global warming “biggest threat”’, 9 January 2004, at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/3381425.stm (last accessed 4th August 2009). 
15 Brown, Hammill and McLeman 2007, n. 9 above, at p. 1142.  
16 British Embassy Berlin, ‘Beckett speech on climate change and security’, 24 October 2006, at: 
http://ukingermany.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/?view=Speech&id=4616005 (last accessed 5th August 2009). 
17 National Public Radio, ‘Climate Change Worries Military Advisors’, April 16, 2007, at: 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9580815&ps=rs (last accessed 5th August 2009). 
18 Brown, Hammill and McLeman 2007, n. 9 above, at p. 1142.  
 5 
Further evidence of the international community’s growing commitment to tackle 
the issue of climate change can be seen from the unprecedented debate led by the UK that 
was held at the United Nations (UN) Security Council on 17th April 2007 ‘on the impact 
of climate change on security.’19 The debate, although greeted with enthusiasm by most 
of the European nations, did encounter heavy doubts from some states. For example, 
China, South Africa and Egypt voiced their views that the Security Council was an 
inappropriate venue to have such a debate. Despite stiff resistance from certain quarters, 
more than fifty states participated in ‘the day-long debate and the majority agreed both 
that climate change presented a threat to international security and that the Security 
Council was an appropriate, albeit not the only, forum in which to discuss the issue.’ 20 
 However, it has to be borne in mind that changes in the environment alone will 
not be a threat to international peace and security i.e. it is not likely to be the sole reason 
to trigger the outbreak of armed conflict.21 It is environmental changes, with the 
combination of existing divisions within society, be they political, economic or social in 
nature. Basically, climate-induced environmental changes is one of many variable factors 
that may trigger or exacerbate a potential conflict situation. 
 
ii) Nexus between Climate Change and Armed Conflict 
 
                                                
19 United Nations Security Council Department of Public Information, ‘United Nations Security Council 
holds first ever debate on impact of climate change on peace, security hearing over 50 speakers’, UN 
Security 5663rd meeting, 17 April 2007, at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9000.doc.htmb 
(last accessed 5th August 2009). 
20 Brown, Hammill and McLeman 2007, n. 9 above at p. 1143. 
21  From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment, Nairobi, UNEP, 
February 2009, [hereafter, 2009 UNEP Natural Resources Report], at: 
http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/pcdmb_policy_01.pdf , at p. 8. 
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A causal link between climate change and armed conflict is explained by the 2007 UNEP 
Report which clearly states that: 
‘complex but clear linkages exist between environmental problems and the ongoing conflict. 
Indeed, climate change, land degradation and the resulting competition over scarce natural 
resources are among the root causes as well as the consequences of the violence and grave 
humanitarian situation in the region.’22  
 
However, the link between climate change, environmental degradation and armed 
conflict is more complicated in reality. The Implications of Climate Change for Armed 
Conflict study commissioned by the World Bank for the “Social Dimensions of Climate 
Change” workshop [hereafter, World Bank Climate Change Study], stated that the 
expected implications of climate change will not cause elevated conflict risk in all 
societies. The study further stated that the extent to which any factors like ‘economic 
instability, political instability, social fragmentation, migration and inappropriate 
response’ pan out and increase the possibility ‘of organized violence depends crucially on 
country-specific and contextual figures.’23 
Some scholars argue that ‘[i]t is unquestionably true that social variables must be 
central to any adequate explanation of human conflict, whether in rich or poor 
countries.’24 Moreover, ‘[t]he societies most vulnerable to environmentally-induced 
violence are those simultaneously experiencing severe environmental scarcity and 
                                                
22 2007 UNEP Report, n. 3, at p. 22. 
23 Halvard Buhaug, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ole Magnus Theisen, 2008 ‘Implications of Climate Change 
for Armed Conflict’, paper prepared by the Social Dimensions for Climate Change program, Washington, 
DC: World Bank, Social Development Department, at p. 2 [hereafter, Buhaug, Gleditsch and Theisen 
2008]. 
24 Daniel M. Schwartz, Tom Deligiannis, and Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, ‘The Environment and Violent 
Conflict: A Response to Gleditsch’s Critique and Some Suggestions for Future Research’, (Summer 2000) 
6 Environmental Change & Security Project Report 77, at p. 81 [Schwartz, Deligiannis, and Homer-Dixon 
2000]. 
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various forms of institutional failure (especially failure of states and markets) that hinder 
social adaptation to scarcity. The key role of social variables must therefore be 
acknowledged.’25 Hence ‘[t]he resource and environmental factors in conflict must be 
considered in the context of a multifaceted view of armed conflict.’26 I will go on to 
consider five primary variable factors: population growth, migration, political instability, 
economic instability and cultural instability.27 
 
Population Growth 
 
Scholars have noted that, in general, ‘one of the most robust findings in the quantitative 
conflict literature is that impoverished and institutionally weak countries, usually 
measured by low GDP per capita, have an exceptionally high risk of armed conflict and 
civil war.’28 Thus, it has been argued that population-induced resource scarcity in 
particular, poses ‘a security threat in developing countries with low capacity to prevent or 
adapt to scarcities.’29  
                                                
25 Ibid. 
26 Nils Petter Gleditsch, ‘Environmental Change, Security, and Conflict’ in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler 
Hampson and Pamela R. Aall (Eds.), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, 
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007, [hereafter, Gleditsch 2007], at p. 185. 
27 These variable factors are non-exhaustive. 
28 Henrik Urdal, ‘Demographic Aspects of Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Armed 
Conflict’, United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Population Distribution, Urbanization, Internal 
Migration and Development, 2008 at p. 3 [hereafter, Urdal 2008]. See also generally, Håvard Hegre and 
Nicholas Sambanis, ‘Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset’, (2006) 50 (4) Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 508 at: http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/50/4/508?ck=nck; Paul Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2355, May 
2000 at: http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/06/17/000094946_00060205420011/Rend
ered/PDF/multi_page.pdf 
29 Urdal 2008, n.28 above, at p.3. See also generally, Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and 
Violence, Princeton University Press, 2001 [hereafter, Homer-Dixon 2001]. 
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 It has also been argued that although population growth rates are decreasing at a 
global level, developing ‘low income countries particularly in parts of Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa will continue to experience very significant population growth rates in the 
near future.’30 Sub-Saharan Africa, despite HIV/AIDS mortality rates, ‘is expected to 
have the world’s fastest population growth’31 and ‘the world’s second most populous 
region, exceeded only by South Asia.’32 The total population in this region ‘is expected to 
peak around year 2080 at about 1.5 billion, almost two and a half times the population in 
year 2000.’33 These areas of predicted accelerated population growth are expected to be 
the most vulnerable, suffering from severe impacts of global climate change.34 The 
African continent in particular, combined with the impacts of climate change, could 
arguably become a hotbed of armed conflicts. Thus, even though population and 
environmental pressures are not likely to be the primary cause of international warfare, 
scholars admit that it could trigger and exacerbate violent local conflicts.35    
 
Migration 
 
Another variable to the impact of climate change is migration i.e. the interaction between 
climate change, forced migration and conflict. Migration in this instance would mean the 
movements of people to better and safer locations as a result of increasing climate 
                                                
30 Urdal 2008, n.28 above, at p.3.  
31 Wolfgang Lutz, Warren C. Sanderson and Sergei Scherbov (Eds.), The End of World Population Growth 
in the 21st Century: New Challenges for Human Capital Formation and Sustainable Development, London 
and Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2004 at p.45. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Urdal 2008, n.28 above, at p.3.  
34 Ibid. See also, Nicholas Herbert Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 at p. 120. 
35  Gleditsch 2007, n. 26 above, at p. 187; Urdal 2008, n. 28 above, at p. 6; Homer-Dixon 2001, n. 29 
above, at p. 179. 
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variability and environmental degradation. Most migrations that occur are domestic in 
nature rather than international. And, any international movements of people would occur 
in the region of developing countries.36 Migration can be a dual cause and effect issue. It 
can be ‘both a cause and effect of worsening environmental conditions.’37  It has to be 
borne in mind however, that it is unlikely that people would migrate solely for 
environmental reasons. Other overlapping factors such as economic, political and social 
aspects within a particular country, would contribute towards the potential migration. 
Those same factors could also influence people to move to the new more attractive 
location.  
Both, ‘the issue of “climate refugees” as a source of conflict’38 and ‘the extent to 
which environmental change is a factor in migration decisions’39 are issues of contention. 
Nevertheless, scholars have admitted that climate change induced migration in certain 
situation can lead to violent conflict.40 The World Bank Climate Change Study sets out 
theoretical possibilities whereby ‘climate-induced migration is argued to lead to violent 
conflict in receiving areas.’41 First, the new migrants may cause competitive scrambling 
over dwindling resources in the new location. Second, if the new migrants are of a 
different ethnicity or religion to the existing population, it may give rise to ethnic or 
religious tensions. ‘Third, large flows of migrants may cause mistrust between the 
sending and receiving state. Finally, climate-induced migration may create or exacerbate 
                                                
36 Jon Barnett, ‘Security and Climate Change’, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, Working 
Paper No. 7, October 2001, at p. 8 [hereafter, Barnett 2001] 
37 Buhaug, Gleditsch and Theisen 2008, n. 23 above, at p. 27. 
38 Urdal 2008, n. 28, at p. 5. 
39 Barnett 2001, n. 36 above, at p. 8. 
40 See for example, Barnett 2001, n. 36, at p. 8; Buhaug, Gleditsch and Theisen 2008, n. 23 above, at p. 27. 
41 Buhaug, Gleditsch and Theisen 2008, n. 23 above, at p. 27. 
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traditional fault lines, for instance when migrant pastoralists and local sedentary farmers 
compete over the use of land.’42  
Urdal notes that ‘[t]he potential for and challenges related to migration spurred by 
climate change should be acknowledged, but not overemphasized.’43 Some climate-
induced environmental changes like extreme weather events or natural disasters may 
cause abrupt and substantial, but mostly temporary migration.44 ‘However, the most 
dramatic form of change expected to affect settlements, sea-level rise, is likely to happen 
gradually, as are processes of soil and freshwater degradation.’45 With regards to gradual 
climate-induced changes, better forecasting abilities and perhaps early warning systems 
would ‘make adaptation easier and reduce the problem of population displacements.’46  
‘So, while abrupt displacements may happen, climate change is primarily 
expected to result in gradual migration. Furthermore, capable governments may in some 
cases be able to prevent or at least drastically reduce large-scale migration in the first 
place, and government capability is also crucial in determining the pace and conditions 
for the return of temporarily displaced populations.’47 Thus, regardless of whether 
gradual or abrupt climate-induced migration occurs, a good and effective governance 
system is needed in the countries potentially affected. 
 
Political Instability 
 
                                                
42 Ibid. 
43 Urdal 2008, n.28 above, at p. 5.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid.  
47 Ibid.   
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Another variable overlapping factor that may cause armed conflict is political instability. 
‘While many countries have the ability to adapt to environmental change, some countries, 
particularly poor and institutionally weak states, are likely to be more vulnerable to 
environmentally related violence.’48 Urdal sets forth the argument that, ‘relatively weaker 
states are presumably more likely to experience resource scarcity conflicts firstly because 
they are less capable of mitigating the effects of resource scarcity, and secondly because 
they are generally more likely to be militarily challenged by opposition groups.’49 There 
is no doubt that ‘strong states’ are less likely to suffer from internal conflicts. ‘They have 
effective administrative hierarchies and they control the legitimate use of force, which 
helps manage potential internal challengers. They also have the capacity to mediate 
impending conflicts before they turn violent.’50 
 Therefore, good governance is crucial. With good and effective governance, it is 
likely that the country in question would be better able to weather any climate-induced 
environmental changes. A country does not have to specifically have a Western style 
democratic governance system. Both, democracies and strongly autocratic regimes would 
likely be able to effectively cope with climate-induced environmental stress and resource 
scarcities.51 The former, with the ability to respond accountably and appropriately to such 
problems and the latter, with the ability to cope due to strict and tighter governmental 
control. Thus, as long as some form of effective governance exists, the state may be less 
vulnerable the implications of climate change. 
 
                                                
48 Urdal 2008, n. 28 above, at p. 6; Homer-Dixon 2001, n. 30 above, p. 179. 
49 Urdal 2008, n. 28 above, at p. 7. 
50 Barnett 2001, n. 36 above, at p. 6  
51 Ibid.  
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Economic Instability 
 
The economic structure of s particular state also plays an important part in preventing 
conflict caused by climate-induced environmental degradation. ‘Greater income may 
indicate less dependence on natural resources, and thus lower vulnerability to scarcities, 
as well as greater economic ability to accommodate groups affected by scarcity.’52 
Gleditsch notes that, ‘[m]any forms of environmental degradation are primarily 
poverty problems….’53 ‘Environmental disasters that at first glance may seem to derive 
form poor economic conditions are frequently the result of poor economic policy 
decisions.’54 This shows that effective and good governance is crucial. It has to be borne 
in mind that ‘[e]conomic policy cannot, on the other hand, provide a short-term cure for 
the poverty that is irrevocably intertwined with large-scale undernourishment and poor 
health. To root out these problems requires long-term economic growth and technological 
progress.’55  
Gleditsch further argues that, ‘[e]conomic development also has a restraining 
influence on violent behaviour in environmental conflict, since wealth is negatively 
associated with armed conflict, interstate as well as intrastate. Wealthy individuals and 
groups stand to lose more if war breaks out. If the wealth is widespread, it is likely to act 
as a general deterrent to participation in major violence.’56  
 
                                                
52 Clionadh Raleigh and Henrik Urdal, ‘Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Armed Conflict’, 
Paper presented to the 47th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA, 
22-25 March 2006, at p. 10 [hereafter, Raleigh and Urdal 2006]. 
53 Gleditsch 2007, at p. 184. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid.   
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Social Instability 
 
Social instability includes cultural clashes between divided ethnic and religious groups 
which could also lead to conflict. This could be an underlying cause of violent conflict 
that is exacerbated by environmental problems, climate change induced or otherwise.57  
Another cause of current conflict is a society that already has a history of 
conflict.58 A history of armed conflict could cause damage and destruction to the 
environment, which in turn could cause resource scarcity. The war torn country, in the 
aftermath of war may end up in a vicious cycle of poverty, poor governance, 
environmental degradation, and a relapse into violence.59  
 
In respect of the variable factors discussed above, Raleigh and Urdal sums it up by stating 
that, ‘[g]enerally, we expect that the capacity to avoid violent conflict over scarce 
resources increases with higher income, stronger democratic or autocratic institutional 
features and with greater cultural homogeneity.’60  Thus, leaving developing, poorer, less 
effectively governed states to be the most vulnerable to climate-induced environmental 
degradation and resource scarcity. 
The 2006 study conducted by Raleigh and Urdal which had the objective of 
predicting ‘future risks of violent conflict under different climate change scenarios’61  
using environmental data stemming ‘from several sources, and include indicators of 
                                                
57 Gleditsch 2007, n. 26 above, at p. 187. 
58 Ibid; see also generally, Arvid Raknerud and Hårvard Hegre, ‘The Hazard of War: Reassessing the 
Evidence for the Democratic Peace’, (1997) 34(4) Journal of Peace Research 385. 
59 Gleditsch 2007, n. 26 above, at p. 187. 
60 Raleigh and Urdal 2006, n. 52 above, at p. 10. 
61 Ibid, at p. 3. 
 14 
freshwater scarcity, productivity of land, and population growth and density’,62 presented 
the suggested results: ‘that water scarcity positively and significantly63 related to conflict 
and the relationship between water and conflict is strengthened in territorial conflicts. 
Higher level of soil degradation are associated with increased risks of conflict, although 
less so in relation to territorial conflict. Population density and growth are positively 
associated with conflict, with density having a smaller and population growth having a 
greater impact on territorial conflicts. Ethnic fractionalization is consistently positively 
correlated with all types of conflicts. Consistent with previous studies of civil war, we 
find that areas in countries with higher levels of per capita income are less susceptible to 
conflict.’64 Hence, it is arguable that the added problem of accelerated climate change 
could cause serious problems 
 
iii) Darfur 
 
I will go on to consider the situation in Darfur as an example. Although many see climate 
change as a potential future threat in respect of armed conflict, some argue that it has 
already had an impact in reality.65 For instance, as mentioned earlier, in the 2007 UNEP 
Report, it was suggested that climate change and environmental degradation did have a 
                                                
62 Ibid at p. 3. 
63 ‘The level of significance is set to p<0.05.’ 
64 Raleigh and Urdal 2006, n. 52 above, at pp. 16-17. 
65 Ibid, at p. 7; Shirley V. Scott, ‘Climate Change and Peak Oils as Threats to International Peace and 
Security: Is it Time for the Security Council to Legislate?’, (2008) 9(2) Melbourne Journal of International 
Law 495,  at p. 504; see also generally, Michael Byers and Nick Dragojlovic, ‘Darfur: A Climate Change-
Induced Humanitarian Crisis?’, (October 2004) Human Security Bulletin, at: 
http://hsbcms.liucentre.ubc.ca/October_2004/Editorials/en/index.php  (last accessed on 18th August 2009). 
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part to play in the conflict in Darfur.66 The report claimed a strong causal link between 
climate-induced land degradation, desertification and violent conflict in Darfur.67 
Darfur, although being the largest region in west of Sudan, is geographically 
isolated, resulting in it being virtually ignored by the central Sudanese government in 
Khartoum.68 The conflict in Darfur was caused by various factors.69 It was initiated by 
natural ecological adversity which was exasperated by serious mismanagement of the 
problems by the government. In northern Darfur rain has decreased by a third over the 
last 80 years70  and it has been suggested that the declining rainfall is attributed to some 
degree to global warming.71  
 As correctly noted by UN secretary-general, Ban Ki-Moon, ‘Almost invariably, 
we discuss Darfur in a convenient military and political shorthand - an ethnic conflict 
pitting Arab militias against black rebels and farmers. Look to its roots, though, and you 
discover a more complex dynamic. Amid the diverse social and political causes, the 
Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate 
change.’72 Violence in Darfur erupted during the drought as a result of a combination of 
these factors. Once the rain stopped, there was no longer enough food and water for the 
population. Thus, fighting and conflict broke out when local groups rebelled, triggering 
                                                
66 2007 UNEP Report, n. 3 above, at p. 22  
67 Ibid. 
68 Leilani.F. Battiste, ‘The Case for Intervention in the Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan’, (2005) 11 Annual 
Survey of International and Comparative Law 49, at p. 51. 
69 Kate Johnston, ‘Climate Change: A Cause for Conflict?’, Global Politics Magazine, January 2008 at: 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/198/40388.html#author (last accessed  1st July 
2009). 
70 2007 UNEP Report, n. 3 above, at p. 60; Lydia Polgreen, New Depths: A Godsend for Darfur, or a 
Curse?, 22 July 2007, The New York Times, at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/22/weekinreview/22polgreen.html?ex=1342756800&en=a7889020c08d2
0b6&ei=5088&partner (last accessed 7th April 2009). 
71 Ban Ki Moon, A Climate Culprit in Darfur, Washington Post, June 16 2007; A15, at:   
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/15/AR2007061501857_pf.html (last 
accessed 7th April 2009). 
72 Ibid. 
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counter attacks by the Khartoum controlled Sudanese central army and government 
backed Arab militias, the Janjaweed. By 2003 this escalated into the tragedy we observe 
today. Nearly four years of armed conflict has killed around 200,000 people and more 
than five million people have been displaced.73 Some 200,000 Darfurians have also 
sought refuge in neighbouring Chad. Furthermore, the ongoing civil war also included 
instances of destruction against natural resources e.g. various water resources and 
systems within Sudan became military tools and targets.74 
Although violence erupted during the drought primarily as a result of diverse 
political and social problems with a combination of food and water insecurity and the 
lack of arable land to go around, tensions in Darfur were simmering just below the 
surface, years before the drought over water, land and grazing rights between the mostly 
nomadic Arabs and farmers from local African tribal communities. The question is, 
whether appropriate preventive measures or a preventive stance taken by the international 
community would have been able to avert such disaster or at least diffuse some of the 
violence. 
 Nevertheless, conflicts do not occur simply because of environmental damage 
and degradation. Indeed, ‘an environmental catastrophe cannot become a violent 
                                                
73 Sudan ‘Accepts UN Darfur Force’, BBC news, 23 December 2006, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/africa/6204489.stm (last accessed 7th April 2009). This report, as known at the end of 2006, stated 
that more than 2 million people were displaced. However, more current reports state that more that five 
million people have been displaced internally as well as refugees in Sudan. See also Environmental 
Degradation Triggering Tensions and Conflict in Sudan, UNEP Press Release, 22 June 2007, at: 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=512&ArticleID=5621&l=en (last 
accessed 7th April 2009). 
74 ‘In 2003, villagers from around Tina said that bombings had destroyed water wells. In Khasan Basao 
they alleged that water wells were poisoned. In 2004, wells in Darfur were intentionally contaminated as a 
part of strategy and harassment against displaced populations.’ Peter H. Gleick, Pacific Institute’s Water 
Conflict Chronology, (updated November 2008), at p. 29, at 
http://www.worldwater.org/conflictchronology.pdf (last accessed 25th August 2009). 
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cataclysm without a powerful human hand to guide it in that direction.’75 Whilst this is 
true, there is no doubt that in this situation, ecological factors, in this case, lack of arable 
land and drought, played a major part in instigating conflict. The UNEP Sudan Post-
Conflict Environmental Assessment report points to an overall spread of deserts by an 
average of 100km in the last four decades, a loss of almost 12% of forest cover in the last 
15 years and overgrazing of fragile soil.76 Unfortunately, the conflict in turn, owing to the 
displaced Darfurians, is further exasperating the spread of deserts and deforestation, 
potentially threatening to raise future ethnic tensions. 
 
iv) Africa 
The World Bank Climate Change Study stated that, ‘[a]rmed conflicts are increasingly 
concentrated in the poorest and most vulnerable portion of the world’s countries. Future 
environmental changes will place further strains on these countries, possibility reducing 
the prospects for conflict resolution and sustained economic growth.’77 And, there is no 
doubt that some of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable countries will be within the 
African continent. As some scholars have noted, ‘[c]limate change is now being recast as 
a threat to international peace and security; and the region seen as most likely to suffer its 
                                                
75 Polgreen, n. 70 above. 
76 2007 UNEP Report, n. 3 above, at pp. 58-68; see also Environmental Degradation Triggering Tensions 
and Conflict in Sudan, UNEP Press Release, June 2007, at: 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.sp?DocumentID=512&ArticleID=5621&l=en (last 
accessed on 7th April 2009). 
77 Buhaug, Gleditsch and Theisen 2008, n. 23 above, at p. 15. 
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worst effects is Africa.’ 78 As it is, ‘[m]ost of the world’s armed conflicts now take place 
in sub-Saharan Africa…’79 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)  in its 2007 assessment 
noted that ‘Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change and climate 
variability, a situation aggravated by the interaction of “multiple stresses”, occurring at 
various levels, and low adaptive capacity.’80 The IPCC goes on to state that: 
 ‘Africa’s major economic sectors are vulnerable to current climate sensitivity, with huge 
economic impacts, and this vulnerability is exacerbated by existing developmental challenges such 
as endemic poverty, complex governance and institutional dimensions; limited access to capital, 
including markets, infrastructure and technology, ecosystem degradation; and complex disasters 
and conflicts. These in turn have contributed to Africa’s weak adaptive capacity, increasing the 
continent’s vulnerability to projected climate change.’ 81 
 
There are a number of factors that make the African region particularly vulnerable to the 
implications of climate change. First, by virtue of the fact that Africa already has a warm 
climate, which is likely to get warmer and drier this century as well as being exposed to 
unpredictable rainfall patterns across the continent.82 Two, particularly since the vast 
majority of the population have a close dependency on natural resources, this change in 
                                                
78 Brown, Hammill and McLeman 2007, n. 9 above at p. 1141. 
79  Oli Brown and Alec Crawford, ‘Climate Change and Security in Africa: A Study for the Nordic-African 
Foreign Ministers Meeting’, Canada: International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 2009, 
[hereafter, Brown and Crawford 2009] at p. 5. 
80 M Boko, I Niang, A Nyong, C Vogel, A Githeko, M Medany, B Osman-Elasha, R Tabo and P Yanda, 
‘Africa. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’ in ML Parry, OF Canziani, JP 
Palutikof, PJ van der Linden and CE Hanson (Eds.), Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 433-67, at: 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter9.pdf (last accessed 6th August 2009) 
[Boko et al., 2007] at p. 435. 
81 Ibid.  
82 See Brown, Hammill and McLeman 2007, n. 9 above, at p. 1145; Brown and Crawford 2009, n. 80 
above, at p. 12. 
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climate will have significant effects ‘on the day-to-day economic development for Africa, 
particularly for the agricultural and water-resources sectors, at regional, local and 
household scales’,83 potentially causing serious problems for food insecurity in the 
region.84 Third, climate change could cause extreme weather events, which ‘[f]or many 
African countries, natural disasters involve too much or too little rain.’85 The region 
could experience severe droughts or flooding as a result of predicted inconsistent rains.86 
Fourth, predicted rising sea-levels will significantly affect many of Africa’s densely 
populated low-lying coastal areas.87 Fifth is the complex combination and interaction of 
socio-economic factors: ‘the lack of good governance; persistent and widespread poverty; 
poor economic and social infrastructure; conflicts and limited human, institutional and 
financial capacities means that as a continent, Africa is least able to adapt to the effects of 
climate change.’88 Thus, ‘[t]he covariant mix of climate stresses and other factors in 
Africa means that for many in Africa adaptation is not an option but a necessity.’89  
  
v) Problems Linking Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and 
Armed Conflict 
 
‘The scientific basis for climate change is increasingly well established, and there is continuous growth in 
the amount of research being done on the biophysical impacts of climate change in terms of raised sea 
                                                
83 Boko et al., 2007, n. 80 above, at p. 436. 
84 Brown, Hammill and McLeman 2007, n. 9 above, at p. 1146. 
85 Brown and Crawford 2009, n. 79 above, at p. 10. 
86 See Brown, Hammill and McLeman 2007, n. 9 above, at p. 1146; Brown and Crawford 2009, n. 79 
above, at p. 10. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Brown and Crawford 2009, n. 79 above, at p. 12; see also, Boko et al., 2007, n. 80 above, at p. 440. 
89 Boko et al., n. 80, at p. 441.  
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levels, altered precipitation patterns, and more frequent and fierce storms, and the likely consequences of 
all these effects for human well-being.’90  
 
Despite the massive media attention and claims that indicated a strong link between 
climate change and armed conflict, academic research on this subject appears to be 
controversial. The conclusion that at present time there exists very limited empirical 
evidence as well as concrete and robust research for a direct causal link between climate 
change and violent conflict, has been put forward by numerous scholars.91 This is not 
surprising due to the complexities involved in the science of climate change. And, as 
Brown and Crawford pointed out, this is ‘even before considering its impact on societies 
with widely differing resources and varied capacities to adapt to external shocks.’92 
 Academic views and research on this subject of climate change and conflict has 
been varied and controversial. For example, researchers like Homer-Dixon (2001),93 
Schwartz and Randall (2003)94 argued that there is a direct link between environmental 
conditions, resource scarcity and the outbreak of violent conflict, particularly in 
developing regions. However, Homer-Dixon did warn that in general, environmental 
stress is likely to cause conflict only in combination with other socio-economic risk 
factors. Barnett (2001)95 concluded that climate change may be a security threat to some 
states and societies, but that due to insufficient evidence from current environment-
conflict research, it is difficult to make a robust claim on the impact of climate-induced 
                                                
90 Brown, Hammill and McLeman 2007, n. 9 above, at p. 1147. 
91 See e.g. Brown, Hammill and McLeman 2007, n. 9 above, at p. 1147; Penny, n. 6 above, at pp. 39-40; 
Gleditsch 2007, n. 26 above,  at p. 181; Buhaug, Gleditsch and Theisen 2008, n. 23 above, at p. 40; Brown 
and Crawford 2009, n. 79 above, at p. 6. 
92  Brown and Crawford 2009, n. 79 above, at p. 6. 
93 See generally, Homer-Dixon 2001, n. 29 above.  
94 See Schwartz and Randall 2003, n. 12 above.  
95 See Barnett 2001, n. 36 above. 
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environmental change on armed conflict. Gleditsch (2007)96 also admitted that resources 
and environmental issues do have a role in conflict, but that these issues and violent 
conflict are influenced by other political, economic and social factors already in play. 
Raleigh and Urdal (2006)97  concluded a link between climate-induced environmental 
changes and violent conflict in the context of local level demographic variable like land 
degradation, water scarcity, low GDP and population density. Buhaug, Gleditsch and 
Theisen (2008) find that prevailing research shows no evidence of a direct link between 
the environment and conflict, but that this could be due to the flaws and limitations 
inherent in existing research. They go on to conclude that despite the lack of systematic 
link between climate change and armed conflict, there is a possibility that a link may 
emerge in the near future. Lee (2009)98 finds that the road leading from climate change to 
conflict will an indirect one, being susceptible to ‘sustained [climate change] trends, 
intervening variables, and the need for conflict triggers.’99 Brown, Hammill and 
McLeman (2007)100 and Brown and Crawford (2009)101 concludes that climate change is 
a ‘threat multiplier’ that intensifies existing problems and vulnerabilities, including 
environmental stress, with a specific focus on Africa. 
Overall, evidenced by the lack of robust finding of the climate change-conflict 
nexus, academics have concluded that ‘much further research is required before making 
confident predictions about climate change and violent conflict. A research programme 
looking to empirically investigate climate-conflict linkages in greater detail would be 
                                                
96 See Gleditsch 2007, n. 26 above.  
97 See Raleigh and Urdal 2006, n. 52 above.  
98 See James R. Lee, Climate Change and Armed Conflict: Hot and Cold Wars, Oxon: Routledge, 2009. 
99 Ibid, at p. 3. 
100 See Brown, Hammill and McLeman 2007, n. 9 above. 
101 See Brown and Crawford 2009, n. 79 above. 
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most effectively targeted at the sub-state level, in weak states or states in economic 
transition where levels of inequality are high, and areas where renewable environmental 
resources are highly sensitive to climate change.’102 
 
C. Laws Affecting Climate Change 
i) General International Law  and Climate Change 
  
Growing global awareness concerning climate change began in the 1970s103 when the 
international community realised that extensive comprehensive scientific information was 
required to gain better understanding of the phenomenon as well as to coordinate a 
remedial system for it. This led to the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment 
in Stockholm, its subsequent Declaration104 as well as the establishment of a specialized 
UN environmental agency, UNEP.105 In 1988, the IPCC was specifically established to 
provide scientific evidence regarding global climate change.106 
There is no doubt that the international community since then, has strived to make 
significant efforts to address the causes of climate change. Almost all states are parties to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992 (UNFCCC),107 
which recognises it its Preamble that the human-induced greenhouse gasses that cause 
                                                
102 For example, see Barnett 2001, n. 36 above, at p. 9;  Gleditsch 2007, n. 26 above, at pp. 181-183; 
Buhaug, Gleditsch and Theisen 2008, n. 23 above, at pp. 41-42. 
103 Penny 2007, n. 6 above, at p. 38. 
104 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, A/CONF.84/14 (1972). 
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106 See n. 4 above. 
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UNFCCC: Status of Ratification, at: 
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global warming ‘may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind.’108 The 
UNFCCC was formulated with the objective of being a set of ‘guiding principles’109 and 
thus, ‘outlined non-binding emissions stabilization principles and information-gathering 
mechanisms rather than imposing specific binding emissions reduction standards upon 
individual states.’110 
Thereafter, building upon the general principles set out in the UNFCCC, the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol111 was set out to establish ‘specific targets for the reduction of 
greenhouse gas production by individual states.’112 The legally binding Kyoto Protocol 
entered into force in February 2005. Nevertheless, as one scholar noted, while Kyoto was 
a crucial milestone in the ongoing process of combating climate change, it was never 
meant to be, not is it in fact, the ultimate solution to the causes and consequences of this 
phenomenon.113 Moreover, the treaty has not been ratified or acceded to by all nations, 
including Australia and the US, both themselves major greenhouse gas producers.114 
Furthermore, being Party to Kyoto itself is not indicative of actual compliance. 
Nevertheless, global ‘efforts to strengthen this regime continue, most recently with major 
multilateral conferences in Montreal,115 in late 2005, and Bonn,116 in May 2006.’117 And, 
the international community’s continuing commitment to climate change is evidenced by 
                                                
108 Preamble, UNFCCC, ibid.  
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the expectation that a hundred and eighty-seven nations will be represented at the UN 
Climate Change Conference held in Copenhagen this December, in an attempt to come to  
‘a new international agreement, to take effect after the Kyoto Protocol expires in 
2012.’118 
Despite global efforts in coordinating multilateral remedial action119 existing 
scientific predictions indicate that climate change has already begun and will continue in 
the foreseeable future. All these international efforts are considered to be a significant 
advancement, which perhaps may be able to minimise the causes and consequences of 
climate change in the foreseeable future, but they will not be able to erase them. Critics 
have also commented that  ‘if measured in terms of global reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions or an improving climate prognosis,’120 the international law intended to govern 
the responses to climate change have so far failed to live up to expectations.121 On the 
other hand, some argue that, ‘[f]rom the perspective of poor and vulnerable communities, 
who are often marginalised in policy-making processes, the climate change process is 
also by far the most open and dynamic multilateral process in town – with powerful 
lobbies in developed countries and increasingly in developing countries emerging to 
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catalyse progressive change across a wide spectrum of actors, such as coalitions of 
marginalised countries supported by NGOs and civil society.’122 
 Despite the differing views on this subject, there is no doubt that addressing the 
causes of climate change is extremely important. However, with the knowledge that 
climate change is already upon us, addressing the implications of climate change is just 
as crucial. It has already been established that despite the limited, complex and 
empirically tenuous climate change-violent conflict link, conflict is arguably a distinct 
possibility as a result of climate change implications. The question is, looking at general 
international law in relation to climate change, do we have an adequate regime to prevent 
armed conflicts borne out of climate-induced environmental change? 
  
ii) Prevention: Laws & Methods for Climate Change Induced Conflict 
 
From the discussion and findings above, arguably there is a link (albeit a vague and 
tenuous one) between climate change and armed conflict. Certainly, there is no question 
that further comprehensive research is required in order to ascertain a more concrete 
causal link, particularly in order for researchers and policymakers to formulate better 
laws and strategies to combat the implications of climate change. This is certainly 
necessary in relation to creating and improving the laws and strategies aimed at 
preventing armed conflict as a result of climate-induced environmental changes. 
 From the research literature reviewed, a repeated assertion seems to be that there 
is limited systematic research to conclusively state that there is a climate change and 
                                                
122 Farhana Yamin, Atiq Rahman and Saleemul Huq, ‘Vulnerability, Adaptation and Climate Disasters’, 
(October 2005) 36(4) IDS Bulletin 1, at p.10. 
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armed conflict link. Therefore, as varying academics hold differing views on these issues, 
it is probably best to use the ‘precautionary principle’in dealing with the implications of 
climate change as it would be the case of ‘too little too late’ once concrete scientific 
affirmation is found.  
The precautionary principle is based on the idea that it is preferable to prevent 
damage or destruction to the environment beforehand despite the lack of scientific 
information, rather than subsequently trying to deal with the damage or pollution after it 
has occurred. As recognised by the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development123 
‘[i]n order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied 
by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.’124 Likewise, Article 3.3 of the 
UNFCCC125 states that: 
‘The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise the causes of 
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such 
measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be 
cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.’ 
 
As the science of climate change, its causes, implications let alone how to deal with the 
consequences are extremely complex and for the most part necessarily speculative, 
                                                
123 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 [hereinafter Rio Declaration], reprinted in 31 ILM 874 
(1992). 
124 Ibid, Principle 15. 
125 See n. 108 above. 
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‘analysts urge decision-makers to apply the “Precautionary Principle”.’126 It has been 
argued that ‘the overall security threat posed by climate change is no less real for this 
uncertainty. Climate change is a reality, and projections indicate that this threat will 
continue in the foreseeable future. That its causes and consequences have not yet been 
adequately identified only heightens its inevitable long-term negative security 
implications.’127 As pointed out by some researchers, ‘uncertainty should not be an 
excuse for failure to act.’128 Therefore, while significant global efforts to reduce the 
anthropocentric causes of climate change proceed, the international community should 
simultaneously develop and implement effective responses to the consequences.129  
Thus, the reality of climate change means that its implications are already being 
felt. Implications which, already has130 or could in the future indirectly lead to or 
exacerbate violent conflict.131 Hence, in relation to armed conflict, international efforts to 
prevent it should probably be channelled to be more region or country specific. 
 
(ii.a) Laws: Region or Country Specific 
 
As discussed above, the countries most susceptible to climate change and potential 
conflict are developing countries saddled with other variables such as low economic, 
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political and social ability to address the implications of this unavoidable phenomenon. 
However, due to the fact that certain regions, states or societies are more prone to 
outbreaks of conflict than others, global efforts in addressing the implications of climate 
change should perhaps prioritize the most vulnerable areas. It has been argued that, 
‘[t]here is substantial spatial overlap between today’s conflict-prone societies and the areas 
expected to be hit most adversely by future climate change. The East-Central parts of Africa, the 
Middle East, and Central and East Asia, which already suffer disproportionately from instability 
and violence, face a double security challenge through additional climate-imposed strains on 
human health and livelihood. This is likely to exacerbate the differences between those who are 
able to adapt to a changing environment and those who are caught in the ‘conflict trap’.’132  
  
 In addition, climate-induced environmental changes are unlikely to occur equally across 
a country. In reality, ‘…severe forms of environmental change are often confined to 
smaller areas than entire countries….’133 and ‘[s]imilarly, violent political conflicts 
seldom affect all parts of the country equally.’134 Simply put, any links between climate 
change and armed conflict is actually smaller in scale than any exaggerated prediction of 
climate change causing all out war or violent conflict as people scramble over 
increasingly dwindling resources. 
In Darfur, for example, conflict occurred between nomadic herders and settled 
pastoralists over arable land. Fighting broke out in one part of the country that was 
suffering from severe environmental degradation as a result of lack of rainfall, rapid 
desertification and land degradation. Of course, conflict did not implode solely over the 
lack of arable land as a result of climate-induced environmental degradation. It was a 
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combination of that and overlapping pre-existing social and political factors. The key 
point here is that environmental degradation exacerbated by climate change alone did not 
cause the outbreak of violence.  
 Therefore, as countries most susceptible to climate change suffer from some form 
of socio-economic instability and the additional fact that the impact of such 
environmental changes would be felt unequally, global efforts of laws and methods 
regarding this subject, including conflict prevention, should be geared more specifically 
towards these most vulnerable societies, particularly within Africa. With respect to the 
other variables such as political, economic and cultural instability, arguably the first step 
for these countries would be to concentrate on achieving some form of good governance. 
 
Good Governance 
 
Research has ‘increasingly demonstrated the links between successful socioeconomic 
development, sound economic and social policies and government capacity coupled with 
political will. These findings have been incorporated into reform agendas under the broad 
rubric of ‘good governance’. Because of the expansive nature of the term, good 
governance can be defined in various ways. In general, governance concerns how a 
society organizes to solve public problems, set policies, allocate resources and produce 
public goods.’135 Elements of good governance which are considered to be widely 
accepted include the following components: effective rule of law, transparency and free 
                                                
135 Peter Glasbergen, ‘Setting the scene: the partnership paradigm in the making’ in Pieter Glasbergen, 
Frank Biermann and Arthur P.J. Mol (eds.), Partnerships Governance and Sustainable Development: 
Reflection on Theory and Practice, Chelternham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007 [hereafter, 
Glasbergen 2007] at p. 97.  
 30 
flow of information, accountability, effective management of public resources, control of 
corruption, citizen participation.136 
Good governance is extremely crucial in relation to conflict prevention and the 
knowledge that Africa, predicted to be one of the most vulnerable regions to climate 
change, requires assistance in achieving good governance is not new. The use of the term 
“governance” surfaced in the World Bank’s 1989 World Development Report137 which 
categorically declared that, ‘[u]nderlying the litany of Africa’s developmental problems 
is the crisis of governance.’138 From here onwards, it became entrenched in the minds of 
the international community that lack of ‘good governance’ is the root of hindered 
economic and social development. And, in society today, an obstacle to environmental 
development as well. Thus, in relation to coping with the implications of climate change, 
‘weaker states’ should attempt to improve themselves in order to be able to cope.  
An example of effective good governance in preventing conflict would be, say 
Palestine and Israel. Thus far neither territory has gone to war over shared water 
resources. The reason could be because these countries have effective riparian 
agreements in place. In fact, according to some academics, ‘water wars’ are unlikely 
because water as a resource is too important to waste fighting over.139 Gleditsch also 
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argues that countries with shared water resources are more likely to cooperate with each 
other to gain access to this precious resource.140 This boils down to the principle of good 
governance. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that such cooperation would only exist 
between countries that have some form of political, economic and social stability. 
Therefore, any laws linking climate change to armed conflict has to look at the principle 
of good governance. Arguably, the more accountable the political regime of a country, 
the more likely the state in question in able to weather the environmental changes 
wrought by global warming. Hence, vulnerable countries should attempt to achieve good 
governance themselves. However, if this is not possible, then the international 
community should step in to help. As discovered above, without effective good 
governance, weak states will be unable to cope with the implications of climate change 
and thus, may be more likely to descend into violent conflict.141 As some analysts pointed 
out based on the predictions in the 2007 UNEP Report,142 ‘[u]ltimately the extent to 
which climate change triggers “a succession of new wars” in Africa, …… depends more 
on governments and governance than on the strength of the climate ‘signal’ itself.’143 
 
 Resource Management 
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142 See generally, n. 3 above. 
143 Brown and Crawford, n. 79 above, at p. 22. 
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The next important factor to consider is natural resource management. As discussed 
above, climate change could potentially contribute to the scarcity of resources.144 
Resource scarcity, which in turn may trigger or exacerbate conflict within societies most 
susceptible to it.145 For instance, UNEP reports that ‘[s]ince 1990, at least eighteen 
violent conflicts have been fuelled by the exploitation of natural resources.’146 Taking 
Darfur as an example, conflict was over fertile land and water.147 Here, ‘[w]ith rapidly 
increasing human and livestock populations,148 the weaknesses of institutions governing 
access to land and water have become more apparent, and some groups have been 
particularly disadvantaged.149’150 Thus, magnifying the fact that natural resource 
management is crucial, especially within the more vulnerable regions. 
There appears to be a degree of consensus amongst researchers that socio-
economic factors ‘determine how countries handle resource scarcity. Economically, 
politically and socially robust countries are probably more capable both to adapt to 
resource scarcity and to mitigate conflict.’151 Therefore, this goes back to the need for 
good governance, which is necessary in order to achieve natural resource management 
(including more equal distribution of resources) to avoid potential conflict. Moreover, 
some scholars have concluded that ‘… natural resource mismanagement contributes to 
                                                
144 Penny 2007, n. 6 above, at p. 39. 
145 A number of researchers support the argument that resource scarcities can lead to or magnify conflict. 
See Penny 2007, n. 6 above, at p. 40; see also Homer-Dixon 2001, n. 29 above, at p. 226; Raleigh and 
Urdal 2006, n. 52 above, at pp. 3-4. 
146 From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment, Nairobi, UNEP, 
February 2009 [UNEP Natural Resources Report], at p. 8. 
147 Ibid, at p. 8. 
148 ‘Darfur’s population has grown six-fold since the 1950s.’ 2007 UNEP Report, see n. 3 above. 
149 2007 UNEP Report, n. 3 above. 
150 UNEP Natural Resources Report, n. 146 above, at p. 9 
151 Raleigh and Urdal 2006, n. 52 above, at p. 2 
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the vulnerability of human systems to climatic hazards, and enhanced management can 
provide a tool for vulnerability reduction’152 in many countries, particularly in Africa. 
 At present, there does not seem to be an adequate global regime to govern natural 
resources. Nor does it seem likely to be established in the foreseeable future. The reason 
being that it would be very difficult to globally attempt to govern each state’s resources 
as sovereignty issues would come into play. Thus, each state would have the 
responsibility of managing its own resources. Of course, in reality, this may prove 
problematic as there are a many countries that are too vulnerable or ‘weak’ to proceed on 
their own. Numerous states, particularly in Africa, ‘currently face developmental 
challenges relating to the unsustainable use of natural resources and the allocation of 
natural wealth.’153  
 These vulnerable states should seek assistance from other more developed 
countries in improving their resource management. However, in the event that the 
conflict-prone state does not attempt to improve its resource management, perhaps the 
international community could try to assist, through local and international NGOs and 
other UN bodies, for example, to prevent the state in question from become even more 
vulnerable to climate-induces environmental changes.  As pointed out by UNEP, ‘[t]his 
changing security landscape requires a radical shift in the way the international 
community engages in conflict management. From conflict prevention and early warning 
to peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the potential role of natural resources 
and the environment must be taken into consideration at the onset.’154  
                                                
152 Abramovitz, et al., 2002, n. 126 above, at p. 8.  
153 UNEP Natural Resources Report, n. 146 above, at p. 8.  
154 Ibid, at p. 6. 
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In practice, more research has to be done as to how to improve resource 
management in vulnerable areas. As for other improvements, the UNEP Natural 
Resources Report,155 though focusing on the post-conflict to peacebuilding stage, does 
make some salient points with regards to natural resource management. 
Recommendations, that are just as important in the preventive stage i.e. to prevent 
conflict arising from climate-induced resource scarcity. For example, that the UN system 
needs to improve ‘its capacity to deliver early warning and early action in countries that 
are vulnerable to conflicts over natural resources.’156 Early warning systems could be 
strengthened by co-operation within the international community, between for example, 
the UN system, states themselves, NGOs both international and local to the vulnerable 
region to indicate potential ‘hot-spots’. Early action includes amongst others, prioritising 
‘capacity-building for dispute resolution, environmental governance and land 
administration in states that are vulnerable to conflicts over natural resources and the 
environment.’ 157 The report went on to recommend the wealth-sharing of natural 
resources, such as mineral, land, water, timber for example, during the peacemaking 
process. This recommendation could perhaps be attempted at the prevention stage. Before 
conflict breaks out, perhaps in vulnerable states, the international community could 
suggest and assist these states to distribute their natural resources more equally. This 
could perhaps be done by setting up regional agreements and bringing this up in global 
climate change gatherings. 
 Simply put, natural resource management is crucial to reduce the vulnerability of 
states and societies to climate-induced environmental changes. States should endeavour 
                                                
155 UNEP Natural Resources Report, n. 146 above. 
156 Ibid, at p. 28. 
157 Ibid. 
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to do so on their own. However, as indicated above, certain weak and vulnerable states 
have the inability ‘to resolve resource-based tensions peacefully and equitably. Indeed, 
conflict over natural resources and the environment is largely the failure of governance, 
or lack of capacity.’158 Therefore, if these states are unable to help themselves, the 
international community should step in to assist in ensuring targeted natural resource 
management. 
 
Adaptation  
 
In the context of climate change, the international community has already made 
significant efforts in relation to mitigation i.e. combating the build-up of greenhouse gas 
emissions. However, as we are now aware, some climate changes are irreversible. And, 
due to the uncertainty as to the exact nature of the impacts of climate change, using the 
precautionary principle, the global community, particularly in the most vulnerable areas, 
need to concentrate more on adaptation i.e. ‘the process of adjusting in response to, or in 
anticipation of, climate change.’159  
Klein has distinguished between two types of adaptation in relation to climate 
change. ‘Reactive adaptation occurs after the initial impacts of climate change have 
become manifest, while anticipatory (or proactive) adaptation takes place before impacts 
are apparent’160 i.e. it ‘involves preventive planning and decision making before impacts 
                                                
158 Ibid, at p. 11. 
159 Abramovitz, et al., 2002, n. 126 above, at p. 10.  
160 Richard JT Klein, ‘Adaptation to Climate Variability and Change: What is Optimal and Appropriate?’, 
in Carlo Giupponi and Mordechai Schechter (eds.), Climate Change and the Mediterranean: Socio-
Economics of Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation (UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002) at p. 34. 
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occur.’161 In respect of the challenges of climate change, there is no doubt that the global 
community has to be prepared for both. Another term to take note of, is ‘adaptive 
capacity’, which ‘is the potential or ability of a system, region, or community to adapt to 
the effects or impacts of climate change.’162 And scholars have agreed that the ‘first and 
most logical response to the complex threat of climate change’163  is adaptive capacity. 
In respect of the climate change regime, the question would be whether there are 
adequate laws regarding adaptation to the consequences of climate change. Some 
scholars have argued that, ‘[g]enerally, the law on adaptation is still in its infancy, mostly 
because the international climate regime has mainly been concerned with preventing 
dangerous anthropogenic climate change to achieve the objective of the UNFCC (Article 
2).’164 Nevertheless, the UNFCCC recognises the international community’s commitment 
and cooperation in addressing the implications of climate change.165 Most notably, 
Articles 4.1, 4.4, 4.8 and 4.9. For instance, in relation to adaptation, Article 4.1, sets out 
that Parties to the UNFCCC, ‘taking into account their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives, 
and circumstances’, are committed to: 
‘(b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional 
programmes containing […] measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change […] 
 (e)   Cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change; develop and elaborate 
appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone management, water resources and agriculture, 
                                                
161 Roda Verheyen, ‘Adaptation to the Impacts of Anthropogenic Climate Change – The International Legal 
Framework’, (2002) 11(2) RECIEL 129, at p. 130. 
162  IPCC 2001, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Technical Summary, Report 
of the Working Group II of the IPCC: Geneva/UNCCC, at: 
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg2/index.php?idp=643 (last accessed 25th August 2009). 
163 Abramovitz, et al., 2002, n. 126 above, at p. 15.  
164 Roda Verheyen, ‘Adaptation to the Impacts of Anthropogenic Climate Change – The International Legal 
Framework’, (2002) 11(2) RECIEL 129, at p. 129. 
165 See n. 107 above. 
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and for the protection and rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought and 
desertification, as well as floods; 
(f) Take climate change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in their relevant social, 
economic and environmental policies and actions […] with a view to minimising adverse effects 
[…] of projects of measures undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt to climate change; […] 
 
In fact, under Article 4.4 wealthier developed countries are required to financially assist 
vulnerable developing nations to adapt to the ‘adverse effects of climate change….’166 
The international community’s further commitment to assist developing countries to 
adapt to climate change is evidenced by the creation of three global funds: the Special 
Climate Change Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund, and the Kyoto Protocol 
Adaptation Fund.167 Funds, which are intended to assist states from adaptation finances to 
technology transfer.168 
In respect as to whether or not these laws are adequate in practice remains to be 
seen. The fact that these provisions exist, could arguably be considered a step towards 
and evidence of a commitment by states to work together in dealing with the 
consequences of climate change. However, some scholars argue that ‘adaptation has not 
been adequately dealt with, even in light of the consensus that certain climate change 
impacts are unlikely to be averted, regardless of mitigation efforts.’169 In fact, there is 
arguably ‘a growing need for the implementation of measures to adapt to an already-
changing climate.’170 
                                                
166 Article 4.4, UNFCCC. 
167 For more information on these funds, see Abramovitz, et al., 2002, n. 126 above, at p. 14.  
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid, at p. 11.  
170 Ibid, at p. 22. 
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What can be done to improve adaptation, particularly for vulnerable areas to 
climate change? It has to be borne in mind, that all factors are interlinked i.e. the whole 
climate change regime, good governance, adaptive capacity, etc, are all inter-linked. For 
example, good governance, consisting of political, economic and social stability enables 
effective resource management which helps states adapt to the implications of climate 
change more effectively. After all, ‘[a]daptation is shown to be successful and sustainable 
when linked to effective governance systems, civil and political rights and literacy.’171 In 
addition, scholars have  ‘acknowledged that effective adaptation measures in regions and 
communities with the greatest vulnerability will likely depend on enhanced natural 
resource management, consistent with broader sustainable development planning 
objectives.’172  
 To better adapt to the challenges of climate change, the international community, 
in co-operation with each other, should strive to improve predictions and thus, better 
integrated early warning systems, regarding potential climate-induced environmental 
changes or disasters that may lead to conflict in weak countries. More research tailored 
specifically to particularly vulnerable regions, countries or societies, as to how best to 
adapt to the implications of climate change, is required. This of course, could lead to 
increased ‘adaptive capacity’. Failing to do so, may mean more climate change related 
disasters, avoidable environmental degradation and resource scarcity, that could lead to 
conflict. 
 
D. Conclusion 
                                                
171 Boko et al., 2007, n. 80 above, at p. 452.  
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In conclusion, increased robust research regarding the causal link between 
environmental problems and conflict, let alone climate-induced environmental 
changes and conflict is needed. More research is required in order to create and 
improve the laws and strategies addressing the implications of climate change i.e. 
adequate measures to deal with and adapt to a climate that is already changing and is 
expected to continue at an accelerated rate in the future. This is of particular 
importance given the potential links of climate change induced environmental 
degradation and armed conflict.  
Although there are existing laws and methods regarding adaptation to climate 
change, they are insufficient. This is particularly so in relation to the most vulnerable 
societies, countries or regions, especially those prone to conflict, which have limited 
adaptive capacity in the face of climate change. With respects to existing laws 
however, it is a question of the international community being willing to robustly 
implement them and perhaps improve their current laws and methods or come up 
with new laws to keep up with accelerated climate change. The international 
community has a long way to go.  
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